Despite the huge success of Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) in a wide spectrum of machine learning and data mining tasks, recent research shows that this powerful tool is susceptible to maliciously crafted adversarial examples. Up until now, adversarial training has been the most successful defense against adversarial attacks. To increase adversarial robustness, a DNN can be trained with a combination of benign and adversarial examples generated by first-order methods. However, in state-of-the-art first-order attacks, adversarial examples with sign gradients retain the sign information of each gradient component but discard the relative magnitude between components. In this work, we replace sign gradients with quantized gradients. Gradient quantization not only preserves the sign information, but also keeps the relative magnitude between components. Experiments show white-box first-order attacks with quantized gradients outperform their variants with sign gradients on multiple datasets. Notably, our BLOB QG attack achieves an accuracy of 88.32% on the secret MNIST model from the MNIST Challenge and it outperforms all other methods on the leaderboard of white-box attacks.
Introduction
Although Deep Neural Networks (DNN) are powerful tools in a wide range of applications, they are vulnerable to adversarial examples, which are crafted by adding small perturbations to benign examples [20] . Perturbations are so small that they are undetected by a human observer while they confuse well-trained DNNs to make wrong predictions, see Figure 1 . Consequently, the lack of robustness of DNNs has raised significant concerns for safety in critical technologies such as autonomous driving and malware prevention [18, 6] .
One approach to increase adversarial robustness of DNNs is to train the model with data augumented by adversarial examples. In particular, [13] suggests the following Empirical Risk Minimization (ERM) as the objective: 
Where θ denotes the parameters of DNNs, data examples x with labels y are from the data distribution D and L(θ, x, y) is the loss function of DNN. S is a set of allowed perturbations for crafting adversarial examples. In this paper, we consider the well studied ∞ perturbations, i.e., given some small threshold , we have δ ∞ ≤ and it implies small visible changes in images for each pixel. Most of the first-order attacks used for adversarial training are crafted under ∞ perturbations. Solving the inner maximization problem equals to finding adversarial examples that the neural network fails to classify correctly while the outer minimization problem tends to increase the robustness against such adversaries.
Raw Gradients To solve the inner maximization problem of ERM in Eq. 1, one class of approach uses firstorder methods to compute the perturbation δ and generate the adversarial example x + δ. However, raw gradients ∇ x L(θ, x, y) cannot be directly applied to images x, because magnitudes of raw gradients are at a different scale to the image pixels. For example, for the MNIST dataset, most components of raw gradients concentrate at values ranging from 10 −5 to 10 −4 , while the pixel value of MNIST images belongs to the set {0, 1/256, . . . , 1}.
Sign Gradients To make use of raw gradients and apply them to pixel values, reseachers consider taking the sign of each raw gradient. In particular, the Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [7] linearizes the inner maximization problem with x F GSM = x + · sgn(∇L(θ, x, y)) (2) Note that sgn(∇L(θ, x, y)) takes the sign of gradients ∇L(θ, x, y), i.e., gradient values belong to the set of {−1, 1}. A more sophisticated approach to generate adversarial examples is to use multi-step FGSM with a smaller step size α, e.g., Iterative FGSM [11] and Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) attack [13] . Evidence in [13] has shown that the PGD attack is the universal first-order adversary.
Quantized Gradient One limitation of sign gradients is that it discards the relative magnitude between each component of the raw gradient. When a component of raw gradient has its absolute value much larger than another component, it plays a more important role in solving the inner maximization problem. However, sign gradients only make the two components share the same absolute value of 1. Because a smaller step size α is used to generate adversarial examples, we consider taking gradient values from a wider range of integers than {−1, 1}. Inspired by the success of quantized gradients [1] in distributed optimization, we introduce Quantized Gradients in first-order attacks to preserve the relative magnitude. Not only do quantized gradients retain the sign of each component, they also round each component to an integer proportional to its magnitude to preserve the relative magnitude. See Table 1 for the comparison between raw gradients, sign gradients and quantized gradients.
Our contributions are summarized as follows:
• We introduce generalized quantized gradients which can replace the sign gradients in existing first order attacks. Specifically, in this paper, we propose Projected Quantized Gradients Descent (PQGD) and DAA-BLOB with quantized gradients (BLOB QG) as extensions of state-of-the-art first-order attacks PGD and DAA-BLOB.
• We show that PQGD and BLOB QG are sharper attacks than PGD and DAA-BLOB, respectively, on multiple datasets. In particular, BLOB QG achieves an accuracy of 88.32% on the secret MNIST model of the MNIST challenge and it outperforms all other methods on the leaderboard of white-box attacks. See Section 4.2.
• We study the effect of maximum allowed perturbation and number of steps on PQGD. Particularly, when maximum allowed perturbation is larger or step number is smaller, adversarial examples generated by PQGD are sharper than PGD. See details in Section 4.3 and 4.4.
• Our technique is simple to implement as it only requires tuning a single hyperparameter b.
Preliminaries
Given an L−class neural network classifier f : R d → R L , for each d−dimensional data example x and its corresponding ground truth label y, a f is trained to match the predicted labelŷ = arg max k f k (x) with the true label y where f k (x) is the kth component of f (x). To attack a welltrained classifier, an adversarial example x adv is crafted so thatŷ adv =ŷ whereŷ adv = arg max k f k (x adv ) given per-
Attacks can be divided into two main categories as summarized below:
• Targeted Attack and Untargeted Attack By specifying a label y =ŷ, an adversarial example x adv is generated with its predicted labelŷ adv = y under the ∞ constraint. It is known as the targeted attack. On the other hand, an untargeted attack only requiresŷ adv to be any label exceptŷ.
• White-box Attack and Black-box Attack If the attack has access to all information of the network and training dataset, it is known as the white-box attack. FGSM and PGD attacks belong to this category because gradients are computed from network parameters and dataset. In contrast, the capability of attackers is more restricted in the black-box attack setting. In this scenario, attackers do not know the network parameters and network architecture, also access to any large training dataset is forbidden. See [14, 15] for a detailed description of black-box attacks.
In this paper, we consider white-box untargeted attacks under ∞ perturbations. We now present a state-of-the-art first-order attack known as Projected Gradient Descent attack.
Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) [13] is shown to be the universal first-order adversary. That is, a neural network trained with adversarial examples crafted using PGD is robust to any first-order attack. Given a chosen parameter α, a training example x and its label y, PGD is similar to the Iterative FGSM attack [11] and applies the following updates at iteration t :
Note that PGD is different from iterative FGSM in that x 0 is randomly perturbed in the vicinity of x, while iterative FGSM has x 0 = x. On the other hand, FGSM uses as the step size while PGD uses α where α is much smaller than in practice. For example, to craft MNIST adversarial examples, one has = 0.3 and α = 0.01.
Proposed Method
In this section, we extend first-order attacks with quantized gradients.
Gradient Scheme
Applicable on Pixels Sign Preservation Relative Magnitude Preservation Raw Gradients Sign Gradients Quantized Gradients Table 1 . Comparison of different gradient schemes
Motivation
Because of the ∞ constraint on the perturbation, each component of the perturbation is valid to take any value from the interval of [− , ]. Using the sign gradient allows the perturbation at each iteration to take values from the set {−α, +α}. One challenge in PGD attacks is to determine other valid perturbations in each iteration leads to better attack. We seek for a solution to the problem. Note that existing works attempt to craft first-order attacks with sign gradients, so the absolute value of the perturbation at each iteration is equal to the step size α. Our research uses different perturbation values for each component to craft a shaper attack, for this reason our work is orthogonal to existing research on first-order attacks.
We first introduce the technique of gradient quantization and propose a generalized gradient quantization to show that existing sign gradient attack can be replaced with the quantized gradient. We inspect the distribution of perturbation values of quantized gradients, sign gradients and raw gradients. Finally, we analyze the time complexity of our approach compared with vanilla sign gradients.
Gradient Quantization
Our approach attempts to preserve the relative magnitude between each component in the raw gradient while it is still applicable on pixel value as shown in Table 1 . Given a positive integer hyperparameter b, data example x and its corresponding label y, the loss function L and network parameters θ, we calculate quantized gradient qg as follows:
1. Calculate the gradient of loss function g = ∇ x L(θ, x, y)
Take the max value of components in the gradient
.
Where function ζ(·) aims to round each component to its nearest integer except when the absolute value of the component is less than 1. Specifically, it takes the following form:
The ζ function enforces each component of qg to be non-zero integer. Function round(v i ) rounds v i to its nearest integer.
Relationship to Sign Gradients In the special case where b = 1, quantized gradient qg degenerates to sign gradient which is used in the current FGSM and PGD framework.
Note that only one hyperparameter b needs to be tuned when computing the quantized gradient qg. When b is set to a large integer, the relative magnitude between each component of the raw gradient is preserved. Each component of the perturbation is rescaled to an integer belonging to
Indeed, gradient quantization is equivalent to finding a scheme to assign different step size to each component of the perturbation. We later show this method of assignment helps to craft more effective adversarial examples, where fewer iterations are needed to generate sharper adversarial examples than sign gradients. For adversarial training, it is too expensive to augument adversarial examples which needs many iterations to generate. If adversarial examples of similar effectiveness can be generated using fewer iterations, adversarial training can benefit from such examples.
Connection to QSGD We briefly review how quantized gradients are used in distributed optimization. In distributed optimization, one of the bottlenecks in performance is the limited bandwidth required to collect gradients from several parallel machines. Quantized Stochastic Gradient Descent (QSGD) [1] is proposed to conserve the bandwidth with a good convergence gurantee. To be specific, each component of the gradient is quantized and randomly rounded to a discrete set of values. Given any gradient v ∈ R d and a hyperparameter s, the quantized gradient Q s (v) is defined as:
Given some positive integer l such that |v i | / v 2 ∈ l/s, (l + 1)/s , ξ i (v, s) is given by
where p = 1 − ( |vi| v 2 · s − l). Experiments show that QSGD significantly outperforms its full-precision variant in terms of convergence speed.
Although quantized gradients used in attacks bear some resemblance to QSGD, there are a few differences between the two quantization techniques.
• QSGD is a randomized approach whereas our method is deterministic. In particular, QSGD randomly rounds every component to the nearest floor integer or ceiling integer, while our approach rounds every component using the deterministic function ζ(·).
• QSGD uses 2-norm of the gradient to divide each component. On the other hand, we enforce the ∞ constraint on the perturbation. So we use g ∞ = max i |g i | to divide each component.
, while our approach constrains each component of qg as any nonzero integer.
Generalized Gradient Quantization
Here, we introduce generalized gradient quantization for first-order attacks.
Recall that at each iteration PGD update has the form of Eq. 3. To integrate quantized gradients with PGD, we replace the sign gradient sgn(∇ x L(θ, x, y)) with qg. It takes the following form:
We name our approach Projected Quantized Gradient Descent (PQGD). To facilitate other existing first-order attacks with sign gradients, i.e., for attacks with the form x (t+1) = Π clip (x (t) +α·sgn(·)), we replace sgn(·) with the quantized gradients to improve the effectiveness of attacks. We call this approach generalized gradient quantization.
Distributionally Adversarial Attack (DAA) is an example of a state-of-the-art first-order white-box attack, which appears on the leaderboard of the MNIST challenge. While DAA is proposed to solve the optimal adversarial data distribution [25] , PGD views each data example independently. DAA is interpreted as Wasserstein Gradient Flows, and the update of DAA using the Lagranigian Blob Method (DAA-BLOB) at iteration t is given as:
where K(·, ·) is a kernel function. We define the following quantized gradient for DAA-BLOB.
DAA-BLOB with quantized gradient (BLOB QG) has the following update in each iteration:
We name this approach DAA-BLOB with quantized gradient (BLOB QG).
Inspection of Quantized Gradient
We plot the histogram of sign gradients, raw gradients and quantized gradients of the adversarial trained MNIST model with various values of b (Fig. 2) . Recall that an iterative attack has a projection operation at the end of each iteration. Therefore, the value change of each gradient component should be within the range of [− /α, /α]. Using MNIST as an example, we have a maximum allowed perturbation of = 0.3 and the learning rate of α = 0.01, so for the absolute value of gradient component larger than α = 30, the value will be clipped inside the range of [−30, 30]. Recall that we use function ζ(·) to constrain each gradient component as non-zero integers. Thus, if we do not apply the constraint, most of the gradient components will have a value of 0. Accordingly these components do not contribute to the crafting of adversarial examples. Therefore we enforce the components to be non-zero integers and they are restricted to the range {−1, 1}, whose count dominates count of the other integer values within the range [−30, 30] as shown in Figure 2 .
Complexity Analysis
We analyze the computational complexity of the quantized gradient here. Compared with vanilla gradients ∇ x L(θ, x, y) has a time complexity of at least O(d) where d is the dimension of data point x. Since computing the maximum M and applying the function ζ takes time of O(d). Because of this, computing the quantized gradient shares the same time complexity as computing the raw gradient. Therefore, our technique introduces low computational overheads. In addition, our approach of gradient quantization is easy to implement. For instance, in our python implementation, we use around 10 lines of code.
Experiment
The purpose of our experiment is to test the effectiveness of existing first-order attacks with quantized gradient (PQGD and BLOB QG) on adversarial trained models compared to the attacks with sign gradients, e.g., PGD and DAA-BLOB.
Experiment Settings
Our code is based on the implementation of PGD and DAA-BLOB. The code of PGD can be found at code site and the implementation of DAA-BLOB can be found at code site. We use PGD, DAA-BLOB, Interval Attacks [22] and Surrogate attack [8] as the baselines in our experiment.
We compare our methods and baseline on the following datasets: MNIST [12] , Cifar10 [10] , and Fashion-MNIST [23] . We mirror the architecture for MNIST and Cifar10 from the architecture used in [13] while we use the same architecture for Fashion-MNIST as that in [25] . We use default training configurations including batch size, learning rate and optimization settings. Cross entropy loss is used in all of our experiments.
Practical Issues Since PGD and DAA-BLOB use randomly perturbed data examples to craft adversarial examples, adversarial examples generated in different runs are not exactly the same. An approach to take advantage of all different runs is to merge various adversarial examples that are misclassified by the classifier during different restarts.
Empirical Results
MNIST We present the result of comparisons between our approach and baseline attacks on secret MNIST model in Tables 2 and 3 . The secret MNIST model is taken from the Madry Lab's MNIST-Challenge competition. We test attacks with quantized gradients with various values of b.
In Table 2 , we compute the worst accuracy and average accuracy of five independent runs under a 200-step attack for each approach on the secret MNIST model. It shows results consistent with experiments from previous works [25] where DAA-BLOB outperforms PGD. Replacing sign gradients with quantized gradients boosts the performance of PGD and DAA-BLOB. Specifically, using quantized gradients in PGD decreases the worst accuracy of the secret MNIST model from 92.56% to 92.17% while using quantized gradients in DAA-BLOB decreases the worst accuracy from 90.48% to 90.07%.
We compare BLOB QG with state-of-the-art methods appearing on the leaderboard of the MNIST challenge. Our BLOB QG approach with b = 200 and 100 restarts achieves a worst accuracy of 88.32% and outperforms all other methods on the leaderboard of white-box attacks (In Table 3 ).
Fashion-MNIST We compare PQGD and BLOB-QG with baseline attacks on an adversarial trained Fashion-MNIST model in Tables 4 and 5 
ents. Cifar10
We compare the performance of adversarial examples generated by PGD and PQGD on the adversarial trained Cifar10 model from the Madry Lab (in Table 6 ). We test a single run of 100-step attacks of PGD and PQGD under 8.0/255.0 and 16.0/255.0 ∞ maximum allowed perturbations.
As shown in Table 6 , for a maximum allowed perturba- 
Effect Of Maximum Allowed Perturbation On Gradient Quantization
We plot the average accuracy of five independent runs of 100-step PQGD and PGD with different maximum allowed perturbations on the MNIST and Fashion-MNIST dataset (Fig. 3) .
The effect of maximum allowed perturbations on the performance of gradient quantization on the MNIST dataset is shown in Figure 3(a) . Here we test PGD and PQGD on an adversarial trained MNIST model. The results show that when maximum allowed perturbation is small, i.e., 0.1/1.0 ∞ perturbation, PGD and PQGD with various b achieve similar accuracy on the adversarial trained MNIST model. When maximum allowed perturbation increases, PQGD with various b is sharper than PGD. Consequently, when the maximum allowed perturbation is sufficiently large, i.e., 0.3/1.0 ∞ perturbation, PQGD with several choices of b outperforms PGD by a small margin.
The effect of the maximum allowed perturbation on the performance of the gradient quantization on the Fashion-MNIST dataset ( Fig.3(b) ). For the Fashion-MNIST dataset, we obtain a similar outcome to the MNIST dataset. Specifically, PQGD with different b outperforms PGD for all maximum allowed ∞ perturbations ranging from 0.1/1.0 to 0.2/1.0. We conclude that when the maximum allowed perturbation is small, PQGD achieves comparable performance as PGD, as demonstrated in the results of Figure 3 and Table 6 . In contrast when the maximum allowed perturbation increases, PQGD creates a sharper attack than PGD. Therefore, gradient quantization is more effective when the maximum allowed perturbation is larger.
Effect Of Number Of Steps On Gradient Quantization
We plot the average accuracy of five independent runs of PQGD and PGD, with different steps on the MNIST and Fashion-MNIST dataset (Fig. 4) . Specifically, we test PQGD and PGD under a 0.3/1.0 ∞ maximum allowed perturbation on the adversarial trained MNIST model while we test approaches under a 0.2/1.0 ∞ maximum allowed perturbation on the adversarial trained Fashion-MNIST model.
As shown in Figures 4(a) and 4(b), PQGD outperforms PGD with each choice of b and for every number of steps ranging from 20 to 100. Interestingly, PQGD produces a much sharper attack than PGD when number of steps is small, e.g., 20 steps. It verifies our pervious claim that quantized gradients make use of the relative magnitude to boost the efficiency of crafting adversarial examples.
In the MNIST dataset, PQGD with b = 1000 achieves an average accuracy of 88.89% on our adversarial trained MNIST model while PGD reaches an average accuracy of 94.26% when number of steps is 20. PGD produces similar performance results to PQGD at step 20, when the number of steps increases to 60. In the Fashion-MNIST dataset, we observe similar effects of number of steps on the performance of PQGD. When the number of steps is fixed to 20, PQGD with b = 500 has an average accuracy of 72.68% on the adversarial trained Fashion-MNIST model, while PGD has an averaged accuracy of 75.27%. Figure 5 shows the effects of the number of steps on the performance of PQGD and PGD on the adversarial trained As the number of steps increases, the advantage of PQGD decreases compared with PGD. When the step number increases to 40, PQGD and PGD demonstrate a similar performance on the adversarial trained Cifar10 model.
Choice of Hyperparameter b
The only hyperparameter we need to tune in our approach is b. We test PQGD and BLOB QG with a wide spectrum of b. In previous sections, we only present part of results because of the space constraint. We observe that on each dataset for small b, i.e. b < 100, attacks with quantized gradients exhibit limited improvement over their sign gradients. When b is moderate, i.e., 100 ≤ b ≤ 1000, gradient quantization achieves the best performance. Therefore we present results when b = 100, 200, 500 and 1000 in previous sections. When b is sufficiently large, i.e.,b > 1000, attacks with quantized gradients gain advantage when the step size is small ( Fig. 4 and 5) . However when step number increases, the accuracy of attacks saturates at a relatively high level, and it will sometimes performs even worse than the vanilla PGD and DAA-BLOB approach.
Related Works
White-box Attack: Recall the definition of the whitebox attack where the attacker has complete access to the underlying classifier information, including network architecture and parameters, training data and labels, even the defense mechanism deployed by the underlying system.
One of the earliest white-box attacks is FGSM [7] , which is used to show the linear nature of DNN causes the vulnerability of DNN to adversarial examples. While FGSM is an attack based on ∞ distance, [16] introduced an attack under 0 distance known as Jacobian-based Saliency Map Attack (JSMA). C&W attack [4] is introduced as an attack which can be applied under 0 , 2 and ∞ distances. It is shown to significantly outperform FGSM and JSMA under the corresponding distance metrics. Research by [21] shows a surprising observation whereby adversarial training with single step attack such as FGSM leads to a degenerate global minimum. They resolved the issue by using attacks crafted from different neural networks. PGD is the universal first-order adversary [13] , and a DNN model trained with PGD is supposed to be robust to any first-order attack.
Our work is an extension of PGD. We replace the sign gradient in each iteration of PGD with quantized gradients. PQGD and BLOB QG belong to the category of white-box attacks because it has access to the network parameters and architecture, training data and its corresponding label.
Adversarial Training Adversarial training was first introduced in [7] and [13] who formally define it through a lens of modified empirical risk minimization (Eq. 1). Evidence in [2] have shown that adversarial training is a stateof-the-art approach to increase the robustness of a model against adversarial examples.
Other Defenses Gradient masking is a defense that causes the target network to generate corrupted gradients [16] . Existing literatures including Thermometer Encoding [3] , Input Transformation [9] , stochastic activation pruning [5] Pre-Input Randomization Layer [24] PixelDefend [19] , and Defense Distillation [17] fall into this category. Research by [2] shows that there are inherent limitations of Figure 5 . Effect of the number of steps on the accuracy of applying PQGD and PGD attacks on adversarial trained Cifar10 models under different allowed perturbations these approaches and these defenses can be bypassed using more elaborated attack.
Conclusion
In this work, we revisit sign gradients, which are widely used in the white-box attacks, e.g., FGSM, PGD and DAA-BLOB. We argue that existing first-order attacks with sign gradients discards the information of relative magnitude between components in the raw gradient and thus affects the process of crafting effective adversarial examples. We propose quantized gradients to preserve the relative magnitude between components of raw gradients and we integrate existing first order attacks with them. Experiments show that iterative first order attacks with quantized gradients outperforms the attacks with sign gradients.
